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THE EMERGING LAW OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY*
Mathew 0. Tobriner**
Are there emerging in the law of today concepts of a new and basic
character which imperceptibly modify our ideas of tort, contract, govern-
mental and group responsibility? Are fundamental social developments caus-
ing these changes? Is the law gradually making an important turn in its
long course down the centuries?
There have been such turns before.
If we may encompass the grand vista, and if we may look far backward,
we find the law, in an early stage in the Greek city-state, an instrument to
maintain a perfectly balanced society-seeking to assign to each individual
a status, or place, where he could pursue his life-course as objectively as a
planet follows its orbit in the heavens. The Parthenon and the sculpture of
Phidias freeze in marble this underlying Greek concept of perfect harmony.
Yet this Grecian status quo, and its offspring, Roman law, were exploded
into a mass of chartless comets by the barbaric invasions.
A slowly-made feudal law emerged, depending in origin on the Greek
concept of status, creating the legal notions of a landlord and tenant, a
vendor and purchaser, a bailee and bailor. Spinning out an elaborate web
of relationships, this law climaxed in the spiritual and temporal domination
of the Church. In the buttress, the transepts, the gargoyles of a Gothic
cathedral, and in a Bach fugue, one finds the same lace-like pattern of re-
lation, interrelation and correlation.
But the refinements of feudalism were at least in part made obsolete by
an expanding need for commerce born of new invention and discovery.
Came the Renaissance, and its fleeting, backward glance at classicism. Then,
too, the courts turned back to Roman law, to find the "Reason" which was
now hailed as the foundation stone of justice. Contemporaneously, roman-
ticism 'and classicism produced much of Renaissance art.
With the Industrial Revolution laissez-faire wrote itself on the law-books.
The manufacturers of Manchester wanted to be free of the encumbering
restrictions of mercantilism and they found their rationalization in the
economics of Adam Smith and the political strictures of Burke. These new
philosophers proclaimed the function of government and of law to be a with-
drawal from society; said Montesquieu, "that government governs best
which governs least." And Adam Smith wrote, "the function of justice is
the protection of property."
Thus the law of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries struck
down governmental regulation, enshrined freedom of contract and insisted
upon individual, if competing and confused, rights. The law afforded scant
succor to those not economically strong enough to assert those theoretical
individual rights.
THE IMPOSITION OF LIABILITY
With these massive turns in the development of law, we come now,
roughly, to the past half century. This is the period of the breaking up of
the era of classic individualism, the growth of governmental regulation and
control, the rise of the administrative state, the formation of new centers of
power.
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What will be the role of the law as to these centers of power? We have
seen the imposition of new legal responsibilities upon the labor union, which,
until comparatively recently, was regarded as a purely voluntary organi-
zation. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
sets up a host of governmental regulations of union internal affairs. Indeed,
our California Supreme Court has in the past thirty years described the
kind of rules which the union could make, the process it should follow in
making them, the procedure permissible in disciplining members, and the
measure of punishment. The court has been properly intransigent in its de-
mand that no member be suspended or expelled without notification of the
charges of the alleged offense and opportunity to be heard in self-defense,
the right to cross-examine accusers and to refute evidence adduced in sup-
port of charges. Independent of statute, the court has defined and elaborated
the relationships between this private law -making institution and its
members.
Will this legal process be followed as to other private law-making
groups? Will the employers' present right to discharge from the job be sub-
jected to similar definition? Will the rules and regulations of the factory
community itself follow the pattern that has been evolved for the union?
The impact of industrialization and urbanization has not been confined
to the inclusion of private groups under the umbrella of public law. Indus-
trialization and urbanization works basic changes in the law of tort. The
cases show a widening of the last clear chance doctrine so that the negligence
of the injured party will not absolutely bar him from recovery. Res ispa
loquitur has been extended. It is more frequently applied to malpractice
cases requiring the physician to explain the cause of the accident or to
suffer an inference of negligence. We see the attractive nuisance further
and further extended, for instance, in the swimming pool cases. And
of course, workman's compensation itself serves as a significant symbol
of the imposition of absolute liability. Many urge, too, that the same con-
cept of liability without fault should be extended to the victims of motor
vehicle accidents. Is there a shifting to society of the burden of loss which
to the individual is unpredictable, unbearable and total? Are we seeking
the outlines of a new concept of social responsibility in the field of torts?
Indeed, the idea of fault, which derives from a moral code, may be almost
anachronistic at a time when we use complex machinery in whose manage-
ment a split-second decision may be fatal. Morality and machinery simply
do not mix. Are we coming closer to the feudal idea of absolute liability?
Does one handling such machinery act at his risk? If his actions cause
harm, is he liable? Does the actor have the opportunity, and obligation, of
protecting himself by insurance?
RETURNING TO THE CONCEPT OF STATUS
The law of contracts, too, has responded to industrialization. For ex-
ample, it has developed rules for interpretation of standardized contracts, or
"contracts of adhesion" which raise presumptions against the makers of
such contracts.
Finally, another illustration of the legal impact of the administrative so-
ciety lies in the developing field of due process of law. With the enhance-
ment of the power of the group, the need to define the rights and obligations
of the constituent becomes more important. There develops a new
individualism, not the old 19th century concept that the individual was con-
stitutionally protected in an alleged freedom from regulation, but the concept
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that the individual is protected as a member of the group from arbitrary
group action. Hence the present emphasis upon due process of law as to
government action against the individual in criminal proceedings or in the
administration of multiple governmental agencies.
These illustrations may disclose a deeper trend of change than might at
first appear. It may be that the emphasis upon individualism, which was the
key characteristic of the law of the last century, is being replaced by the
concept of status or relationship. Indeed, the common law has its roots in
the feudal theory of relationship. Its very terminology, flowing from the
relation of lord and serf, rests in notions of other relationships, such as that
of landlord and tenant, vendor and purchaser, bailor and bailee. Perhaps
we are reapplying the concept of status and relation to the complex society
of today.
In the instances set out above, and in whole categories of law, such as
the field of insurance, of contract, and innumerable others, we witness the
development of a law of status and relationship, unique and specific in the
particular field involved, We are passing from an older stage of law, in
which the absolutism of individual right blocked the need for society to
function in groups, to a stage of law in which the absolutism of the group is
being subjected to the right of the individual to live and function in, and
with respect to, the group.
Thus we place a new emphasis upon inter-personal and inter-group
legal relationships and obligations in the place of nineteenth century in-
sistence upon "individualism." The freedom and the consequent irrespon-
sibility of that artificial individualism succumbs, in the second half of the
twentieth century, to less economic freedom and more social responsibility.
The complexity and integration of our industrial society itself compel these
changes in the law. But these new definitions signify, too, a recognition of
responsibility to others, which, in another aspect, represents moral respon-
sibility, morality itself.
The next giant turn in the law may be legal expression of individual and
group responsibility to society as a whole.
